韩进破产 航运业不再需要大油轮

"I am big. It’s the pictures that got small, protests the ageing silent film star Norma Desmond in Sunset Boulevard. The same could be said about global Trade by Maersk Line and other shipping companies whose gargantuan container vessels make their way between Asia, the US and Europe part empty.

我依然是大（明星），是现在的电影变小了，在《日落大道》(Sunset Boulevard)里，日渐衰老的默片明星诺尔玛•德斯蒙德(Norma Desmond)抗议道。同样的话也适用于马士基航运公司(Maersk Line)和其他航运公司承载的全球贸易，如今它们庞大的集装箱船在部分空载的情况下航行于亚洲、美国和欧洲之间。

The bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping, the world’s seventh largest operator, has made the mismatch of ambitions and reality very clear.

世界第七大航运公司韩进海运(Hanjin Shipping)破产，非常清楚地表明了雄心和现实之间的错位。

This was supposed to be the age of the ultra-large container ship, piled with thousands of steel boxes holding clothing, toys and Apple iPhone 7s.

当下理应是超大型集装箱船的时代，这些船上堆满成千上万装着服装、玩具和苹果(Apple) iPhone 7的钢质箱子。

The world turns out to need smaller ships, or fewer of them.

然而世界其实需要更小，或者更少的船。

Hanjin ships anchored offshore since last week because ports would not touch them, or sequestered in Singapore and China, could soon be unloaded.

最近在海上抛锚的韩进船舶（或是因为港口不让其靠泊，或是因为在新加坡和中国遭到扣押），或许很快就能卸货。

But the shock of the first bankruptcy of a major container shipping company since the collapse in 1986 of United States Lines will keep reverberating.

但韩进破产引发的冲击波还将持续回荡，这是自1986年美国航运(United States Lines)破产以来大型集装箱航运公司的第一起破产。

It is always puzzling with hindsight when companies in cyclical industries such as mining and reinsurance repeat the same mistake.

事后看来往往令人费解的是，采矿业和再保险业等周期性行业的企业会重复同样的错误。

They invest heavily near the peak of the cycle, trying to beat competitors.

它们在接近周期顶峰的时候大举投资，试图打败竞争对手。

Then a downturn arrives at the same time as their new capacity, prices plunge and the weakest collapse.

然后低迷时期和它们的新运力同时到来，价格暴跌，最弱的企业破产。

Short memories and young executives are probably to blame.

健忘和年轻高管很可能要负一部分责任。

Shipping companies have an excuse: they have not been through a crisis of this length and intensity before.

航运公司有一个借口：它们从未经历过如此漫长、如此猛烈的危机。

Since Sea-Land, founded by the industry’s pioneer, Malcolm McLean, loaded the first box containers in Newark, New Jersey, in April 1956, the industry has mostly grown.

自1956年业界先驱马尔科姆•麦克莱恩(Malcolm McLean)成立的Sea-Land在新泽西州纽瓦克(Newark)装载第一批集装箱以来，这个行业在大部分时间里不断壮大。

Container ships either gained market share from vessels that stowed cargo piece by piece, or overall demand rose as world trade outpaced that of the world economy — or both.

集装箱船或是从散装货轮夺取市场份额，或是受益于世界贸易增速快于世界经济增速带来的整体需求增长——或者二者兼而有之。

The downturns lasted only for a year or two (US Lines was one of McLean’s failed ventures) and governments or creditors kept weak companies afloat.

过去的低迷期仅持续一两年（美国航运是麦克莱恩失败的企业之一），政府或者债权人会支撑较弱的企业维持运营。

The supercycle has turned for two reasons.

这一超级周期的转向有两个原因。

One is that growth in global trade has sagged.

一是全球贸易增长放缓。

It has expanded in line with global economic growth, not faster, for the past five years, having been increasing at double that rate during the previous five years, according to the World Trade Organisation.

根据世界贸易组织(WTO)的数据，在过去5年，全球贸易的增速与全球经济增速持平，而不是更快，而在之前5年，前者的增速是后者的2倍。

Rapid globalisation, which unleashed demand for ships carrying goods from China, has eased and is unlikely to return quickly.

快速全球化曾经带来对船舶的旺盛需求，这些船舶从中国运载货物至世界各地，但全球化进程已经放缓，而且不太可能迅速恢复。

The political climate on both right and left has turned against multilateral trade deals between the US, the EU and countries in Asia.

左翼和右翼的政治气候都已转向反对美国、欧盟(EU)和亚洲国家之间的多边贸易协定。

Discontent about the impact of trade has swayed the presidential campaigns of both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton.

对贸易带来的冲击的不满，影响了唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)和希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)双方的总统竞选平台。

Second, shipping companies grew faster than even buoyant globalisation justified.

其次，航运公司增长的速度过快，即使全球化蓬勃发展也无法消化这样的增长。

The average size of container ships has increased by 90 per cent in the past two decades, and total fleet capacity in 2015 was four times that of 2000.

过去20年里，集装箱船的平均吨位扩大了90%，2015年总运力达到2000年的4倍。

Shipbuilding has accelerated since 2007, becoming completely disconnected from levels of demand, according to one OECD study.

据经合组织(OECD)的一项研究，造船活动在2007年以后加速发展，与需求水平完全脱节。

The ultimate symbols of this are ultra-large container ships, such as the 20 Triple E vessels brought into service by Maersk since 2013.

这一趋势的终极标志是超大型集装箱船，比如马士基自2013年以来投入运行的20艘3E级集装箱船。

The ships cost $190m each and carry the equivalent of 18,000 of the original 20 foot containers (many modern ones are twice this size).

这些船每艘造价达到1.9亿美元，可运载相当于18000个20英尺长的标准集装箱（现代很多集装箱的尺寸是这种标准箱的2倍）。

Maersk’s competitors have since launched even larger vessels.

马士基的竞争对手近年启用了更大的船舶。

More ships are now at sea than in the past.

如今在海上航行的船舶比过去更多。

Container ships operate like buses on fixed timetables, unlike bulk carriers, which are akin to taxis.

和类似出租车的散货船不同，集装箱船一般被用于提供班轮服务。

Shipping companies once sailed weekly but, in 2011, Maersk launched its Daily Maersk service from China to northern Europe.

航运公司曾经每周发船，但在2011年，马士基推出了从中国到北欧的天天马士基(Daily Maersk)服务。

It scaled back the service last year because of weak demand.

由于需求疲弱，马士基去年缩减了该项服务。

Having rebounded from the 2008 crisis with a couple of very profitable years, shipping companies face an intense glut.

2008年危机过后，航运公司业务反弹，经历了获利丰厚的两年，如今它们面临严重运力过剩。

More and larger ships combined with weak demand have created over-capacity of up to 30 per cent.

船舶更多、更大，而需求疲弱，造成了高达30%的运力过剩。

In theory, Maersk and its largest rivals, such as Mediterranean Shipping and CMA CGM ought to benefit from the Hanjin bankruptcy.

理论上，马士基及其最大的一些竞争对手，如地中海航运公司(Mediterranean Shipping)和达飞海运集团(CMA CGM)，应该能从韩进的破产中获益。

If smaller companies with less capital fail, it should push shipping capacity out of the industry and raise rates.

规模较小、资金较少的公司倒闭，将把一些运力挤出行业，从而推高运费。

This was the reason Maersk built ultra-large ships: to achieve economies of scale and make life harder for Hanjin and others.

这是马士基建造超大型集装箱船的初衷：实现规模经济，让韩进和其他航运公司的日子更难过。

It has not worked.

这一招没能奏效。

Maersk Line has swung into loss this year and its parent AP Møller-Maersk replaced its own chief executive in June; Søren Skou, the new boss, is planning a restructuring.

马士基航运今年陷入亏损，母公司马士基集团(AP Møller-Maersk)今年6月更换其首席执行官；新老板索伦•斯科(Søren Skou)正在计划重组。

The Triple E expansion worked only too well: instead of steadily squeezing its rivals, Maersk rapidly crushed everyone including itself.

3E级集装箱船队扩充的效果实在太好：马士基并不是稳步将对手挤出这一行业，而是迅速打垮了所有人，包括它自己。

The industry plainly needs to cut capacity; the difficulty is summoning up the nerve to take painful action.

这个行业显然需要削减运力：困难之处在于鼓起勇气采取痛苦的举措。

Bankruptcies and mergers such as Hapag-Lloyd’s acquisition of United Arab Shipping in June are a start.

破产和兼并——如赫伯罗特(Hapag-Lloyd)今年6月收购阿拉伯联合航运公司(United Arab Shipping)——是一个开始。

But reducing the number of shipping companies does not necessarily cut the number of vessels: companies have often kept ships at anchor in periods of subdued demand rather than breaking them up.

但是，减少航运公司的数量并不一定能削减船舶的数量：在需求低迷时期，企业往往会让船舶闲置，而不是狠心拆解这些船舶。

Ships must be destroyed this time, even big, expensive ones.

这一次，拆船势在必行，哪怕是昂贵的大型船舶也不能例外。

Ultra-large, single hulled oil supertankers were all the rage in the 1970s; you do not see many of those any more.

上世纪70年代，超大型的单壳超级油轮曾经风行一时；今天你可看不到多少这样的船。