美国应在亚洲摒弃冷战思维

In a thinly veiled admonishment, the White House recently accused the UK – our closest ally – of “a policy of constant accommodation” towards China. The parallel drawn to the historical appeasement of Germany by an apprehensive Europe was lost on no one, nor indeed the overwrought nature of the underlying concern.

最近，白宫(White House)向其最亲密的盟友英国发出了一个几乎不加掩饰的告诫，指责其对中国奉行“不断迁就的政策”。这显然是想让人联想起历史上惶惶不安的欧洲对德国采取的绥靖政策，与此同时，所有人也都明白，美国这块“心病”其实是由过度紧张造成的。

The proximate cause of this spleen-venting was the surprise breaking of ranks by the UK to join as a founding shareholder the nascent China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB.) This initial $50bn fund has as its’ agenda the financing of overdue infrastructure in Asia.

美国如此大发脾气，直接原因是英国与美国分道扬镳、决定以创始股东身份加入由中国主导的新生的亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB，简称：亚投行），这让美国颇感意外。亚投行初始资本为500亿美元，目标是为亚洲早该建设的基础设施提供融资。

It is of a piece too with the recent proposal by China to form a Brics bank focused on its’ partners in Brazil India, Russia and South Africa. There is also then the ambitious “New Silk Road” project, which aims to generate greater connectivity between Asia and beyond – by land and by sea. All of this stands against the backdrop of a US-led effort to hammer out a Trans Pacific Partnership with the very same partners in Asia, conspicuously excluding China.

这与中国近期提出的建立“金砖银行”(Brics bank)的计划非常相像。金砖银行的注意力将主要放在中国的合作伙伴巴西、印度、俄罗斯和南非身上。另外还有雄心勃勃的“新丝绸之路”(New Silk Road)计划，目标是通过陆路和海路加强中国与亚洲乃至更遥远地区的连通性。这些都与美国目前牵头展开的一项努力针锋相对：美国正努力与中国上述计划所涉及的那些亚洲合作伙伴敲定《跨太平洋伙伴关系》(TPP)协定，引人注目的一点是，该协定将中国排除在外。

The UK has since been followed by very nearly the rest of our allies – save Japan – in signing up with the more than 30 countries that have already chosen to join. We are increasingly alone in our worry that a China dominated enterprise may not follow international standards of creditworthiness, transparency, and environmental sensitivity that the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank adhere to.

美国的所有盟友（日本除外）后来几乎都在效仿英国的做法，与30多个已决定加入亚投行的国家签署入行协议。美国担心，一个由中国主导的组织或许不会像世界银行(World Bank)、国际货币基金组织(IMF)和亚洲开发银行(ADB)那样遵守有关信誉、透明度和环保敏感性的国际标准，但持同样担心的国家现在越来越少。

While US officials are not directly discouraging other nations from joining the bank, the opposition is consistent with the impression in Asia that our efforts are aimed at bolstering our martial superiority with a soft economic superiority that seeks to displace China from the already pivotal role it has in the furthering of Asian economies.

尽管美国官员没有直接劝说其他国家不要加入亚投行，但是这种抵制的态度符合美国给亚洲留下的印象：美国想以软性的经济优势来巩固自身的军事优势，而这种经济优势意味着不让中国在促进亚洲经济发展方面继续扮演其已在扮演的关键角色。

It does not help the White House that Congress has stalled proposed reforms to the IMF, which would double the fund’s resources and give more voting power to the BRICS, most notably China. In short, whether it is White House or Congressional policy or both, US impediments to IMF reforms have accelerated China’s opportunity to lead in the region.

美国国会阻挠拟议中的IMF改革，也就是将IMF的资本增加一倍并给予金砖国家、尤其是中国更多投票权。这种做法对白宫并无助益。简而言之，不管这是白宫的政策，还是美国国会的政策，还是二者共同的政策，美国阻挠IMF改革的做法都加大了中国在亚洲担当领导者的机会。

We are unable also to bolster a viable regional alternative to the AIIB. The most likely candidate, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), is chronically underfunded and unable to serve as the lead organizing force for a much overdue Asian investment resurgence. The US has not met its funding commitments to either the IMF or ADB, in spite of the ADB’s own estimates that Asia needs at least $8tn in infrastructure investment.

美国也无法找到一个能在该地区有效替代亚投行的实体并予以支持。最有可能的候选者是亚开行，但长期资金不足的亚开行无法担当主要的组织者、促成早该出现的亚洲投资复兴。无论是对亚开行还是对IMF，美国都没有兑现其出资承诺，尽管亚开行自身的估计数字显示亚洲至少需要8万亿美元基础设施投资。

Significant projects such as Asian rail links, hydroelectric power and logistical links all require deep pocketed and patient sponsors that the West’s riven political structures simply cannot provide the consensus for anymore. The equivalent of the New Deal for Asia – mirroring the commitment and policy cohesion under which the US stitched together a continent with roads, while raising a generation out of poverty – is simply not imaginable today with the backing of the World Bank, IMF or the ADB. It is inevitable then that as resurgent Asian economies welcome abundant and flexible Chinese investment, the US appears weaker by being unable to mobilise the West to offer a compelling alternative.

亚洲的铁路网、水力发电和物流网等重大项目，都需要财力雄厚又有耐心的投资者，而西方四分五裂的政治结构根本无法再为此达成共识。今天，要想在亚洲复制当年美国的“新政”(New Deal)，即像美国那样靠承诺和政策凝聚力把整块大陆用道路连通起来、同时让一代人脱离贫困，靠世行、IMF或亚开行的支持是根本不可想象的。因此，随着复兴中的亚洲经济体对充裕而灵活的中国投资表示欢迎、而美国又无法动员西方提供一个令人难以抗拒的替代选择，美国显现出颓势就是不可避免的。

Far away from the teeming capitals of Asia, many in the US are unaware also of how radically different the world view is of the western dominated global development bodies. The tough love austerity recipes that the IMF and World Bank routinely impose on Asian countries in exchange for aid or sponsorship are increasingly seen as severe and slavishly theoretical. We run the risk of appearing hypocritical when we in the West bail out our own banks and major industries in carefully and centrally planned moves, while insisting upon letting transparent and unfettered market forces determine the fate of Asian institutions when they run aground.

另外，由于与亚洲各国人口众多的首都相距甚远，美国的很多人不了解世界对西方主导的全球开发机构有着多么截然不同的看法。IMF和世行经常会向亚洲国家开出代表“严爱”的紧缩处方、以此作为向它们提供援助和资助的条件，人们越来越认为这种做法既苛刻又教条。当西方人一面以小心翼翼和中央计划的举措纾困自己的银行和主要产业、一面却坚决要求让透明和不受约束的市场力量决定陷入困境的亚洲机构的命运时，就会在别人眼中可能会成为“虚伪”的代名词。

We fail also to properly evaluate how essential China’s investment is to our own domestic economy. In a still fragile housing market Chinese investment into US residential property amounts to nearly $22bn with most of it in stable hard cash, impervious to market jitters. Consider also the overall very welcome foreign direct investment from China which in California alone tallies up at an astonishing $12bn, far outpacing any other source and certainly eclipsing locally led investments. Further, Chinese investment into California alone has a potential to reach an astonishing $60bn by 2020 if the state and the private sector maximise the partnership.

至于中国投资对美国国内经济有多么重要，美国也没能做出正确评估。在美国房地产市场依旧脆弱之际，中国对美住宅地产投资已逼近220亿美元，其中大多数投资是以不受市场波动影响的、可靠的现款来完成的。再考虑下整体上很受欢迎的来自中国的外商直接投资(FDI)，仅在加利福尼亚一个州就达到令人吃惊的120亿美元，远远超过来自任何其他国家的投资，当然也让来自美国国内的投资黯然失色。此外，如果加州公共及私营部门能最大限度地发展利用这种合作关系，那么到2020年时，中国仅对加州一个州的投资就有望达到令人乍舌的600亿美元。

It is clear then that the economic fallout would be severe if Chinese investors pulled back from new investment in California, New York, Texas, Illinois, or Washington, to name just the most popular destinations of Chinese investment. As an American and the CEO of an Asian bank based in the US, it is clear to this observer that the repercussions would affect us greatly.

因此，如果中国投资者撤回新近在加州、纽约州、德克萨斯州、伊利诺伊州或华盛顿州（这里仅举几个最热门的中国投资目的地）的投资，显然会造成严重的经济后果。我既是一名美国人又是一家亚洲银行美国区的首席执行官，在我这样的专业人士看来，这些后果无疑会严重影响到我们。

As China approaches the status of the world’s largest economy, it has become an integral part of the global financial system. It is both bad policy and an ahistorical view that any strengthening of China regionally is necessarily damaging to US interests in Asia. The US would be better served if we did not continue to treat China as a junior partner in its own backyard, and form a diplomatic partnership instead that recognises China’s importance to the development of Asia and as an intermediary funneling domestic surpluses into high value investments around the globe.

随着中国逐渐登上世界最大经济体的宝座，它已成为全球金融体系不可或缺的一部分。有人认为中国的地区影响力增强必然会损害美国在亚洲的利益，这是一种有悖历史潮流的观点，会催生糟糕的政策。假若美国不再把中国视为其所在地区内的次要合作伙伴，而是与其建立一种新型外交合作关系，承认其对亚洲发展的重要性、以及其作为把国内过剩资本导向世界各地高价值投资之中介的重要性，会更符合美国的利益。

It is true that we started this century believing that we would enjoy center stage in a permanently uni-polar world, but that is just not the case anymore. China differs from previous rivals we have historically faced in one crucial way in that its’ strategic goals are driven largely by economics and a desire to maintain internal social and economic stability.

没错，本世纪开始时我们曾认为自己会在这个永久的单极世界里出尽风头，但现在这种想法已不再成立。在一个至关重要的方面，中国与美国过去遭遇的对手并不相同：中国的战略目标主要受经济状况以及维持国内社会和经济稳定的愿望驱动。

There is little apparent desire or motive to subjugate the globe as they are not in their current form driven by an ideological imperative of lethal opposition to the US or democratic nations in general, as we were used to from our old foe the Soviet Union. Hence, holding on to the narrative of the Cold War will lead only to wasted treasure and a stalemate neither we nor the rest of the world can afford.

中国没有什么明显的欲望或动机去征服世界，因为其目前所处的阶段并不受极力反对美国或整个民主世界（过去，我们的老冤家苏联曾这样对待我们）这种意识形态使命的驱动。因此，死抱着冷战思维不放，只会造成财富浪费以及无论美国还是世界其余国家都承受不起的对峙。

With more than seven per cent of our national debt – the most of any nation – and the world’s largest stockpile of greenbacks outside of the US, China realises the almost umbilical stake they have in the continuous health of the US. While the US certainly does not treat China as gravely as we once did the Soviet Union, the rhetoric is heating up and has the potential to escalate if not handled with care.

中国持有逾7%的美国国债，是我们最大的债权国，同时也是世界上除美国外美元储备最多的国家。中国明白自己的利益与美国的长久健康息息相关。美国现在当然没有像过去对待苏联那样冷酷地对待中国，但冷战叙事正在升温，若不小心应对，这种叙事可能会升级。

Noor Menai is President & CEO of CTBC Bank USA and former CEO of Charles Schwab Bank

本文作者是中国信托商业银行美国(CTBC Bank USA)总裁兼首席执行官，曾任嘉信银行(Charles Schwab Bank)首席执行官